Earlier this month, the United States, citing heightened risk of terrorist attacks, withdrew all non-essential staff and their families from its embassy in Abuja, Nigeria’s political capital.
Nigeria responded by stating that while American concerns were well intentioned, they did “not reflect the overall security situation” in the country. Within days, however, a confidential memo from Nigeria’s border security surfaced, appearing to validate Washington’s warning.
According to the leaked memo, sleeper cells linked to Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Boko Haram are planning coordinated attacks on key facilities in Abuja. Reported targets include a prison, a military detention centre and the Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport. Although authorities have neither confirmed nor denied the alert, increased security deployments and stronger fortifications have since been observed around the listed locations.
The significance of any terrorist attack on Abuja would be immense. As the seat of government, the city also hosts diplomatic missions, multinational offices and a large foreign population, making it one of the country’s most sensitive locations.
Abuja has previously suffered major terrorist attacks. In 2011, Boko Haram detonated a car bomb at the United Nations office in the city, killing at least 18 people. Another suicide bombing at the headquarters of the Nigerian Police Force in June of the same year killed at least six people. Similar attacks continued in subsequent years, heightening concerns among diplomats and prompting foreign missions to strengthen their security measures. The United States also ordered a similar evacuation in October 2022 over fears of attacks on the capital.
Since 2009, Nigeria has battled a prolonged and overlapping security crisis marked by kidnappings, banditry and terrorism across much of the northern region. The situation drew international attention last year when President Donald Trump redesignated Nigeria a Country of Particular Concern (CPC), accusing the country of tolerating the slaughter of Christians, a claim Nigeria strongly rejected.
Trump also threatened military action if Nigeria failed to protect Christians. On Christmas Day last year, he reportedly followed through by authorising an airstrike against ISIS-affiliated targets in Sokoto State.
The diplomatic fallout that followed led Nigeria to launch an extensive public relations effort in Washington, including a $9 million contract with DCI Group to manage its image on Capitol Hill. Another lobbying firm, Valcour Global Public Strategy, was also engaged for the “purpose of strengthening the bilateral relationship” between Nigeria and the United States.
Tensions eased in January when Washington softened its criticism and instead pursued joint efforts with Nigeria to address the crisis. In February, the United States deployed 200 troops alongside multiple MQ-9 Reaper drones to assist with training and intelligence gathering.
Despite that support, killings have continued across the country involving both Christian and Muslim communities. In early February, gunmen suspected to be Boko Haram or the ISIS-affiliated Lakurawa group attacked Woro and Nuku, two Muslim-majority villages in Kwara State, killing between 170 and 200 people.
Survivors said the communities were targeted because residents refused to join the jihadists or accept their extremist interpretation of Islam. Victims were reportedly tied up and executed, while others were trapped and burned alive inside shops.
On Palm Sunday, March 29, at least 20 people were killed in an attack by Fulani militia on Angwan Rukuba, a Christian community in Plateau State.
President Bola Ahmed Tinubu later assured grieving residents in Jos that “this experience will not repeat itself,” yet fresh massacres were subsequently reported in Nasarawa, Zamfara, Borno, Benue and Kaduna states, raising further concerns over public safety.
Large-scale kidnappings have also become increasingly common. Amnesty International estimates that more than 1,100 people were abducted between January and April this year. The UNHCR also reports that over 3.7 million Nigerians were internally displaced as of early 2026 because of the widening violence.
The resurgence of jihadist activity in Nigeria reflects a wider regional trend, with groups such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) carrying out deadly assaults and laying siege to towns across the Sahel, particularly in Mali and Burkina Faso.
The reported Abuja plot closely resembles an operation carried out by Islamic State Sahel Province in neighbouring Niger Republic earlier this year. On January 30, militants armed with explosives launched a major assault on Diori Hamani International Airport and the nearby Base 101 in Niamey, injuring four soldiers and destroying passenger aircraft and military hangars.
A similar strike on Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport, which handles between three and five million passengers annually, could have severe consequences.
Security analysts note that preventing one attack is not the same as winning the broader war against terrorism. While the United States has approved about $1.8 billion in weapons sales to Nigeria over the past decade, the operational strain on an overstretched military deployed across a territory larger than France remains unresolved.
As a result, troops may retake areas from insurgents but often struggle to hold them long enough to ensure lasting stability.
The worsening crisis continues to expand faster than current counter-terrorism efforts can contain it. According to the Institute of Security Studies, jihadist groups remain resilient partly because of vast ungoverned spaces that allow them to regroup, rearm and recruit.
Experts argue that lasting victory will require more than military force. They say Nigeria must urgently expand governance, public services and accountability into neglected communities, reducing the vacuum extremist groups continue to exploit.
